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Implied and Conditional Consent in
the Sale of Horse Shares or Seasons
By SARA GRINNELL SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
In September, 1985, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.' Trimble involved the ques-
tion "whether a provision in the syndicate agreement of a syn-
dicated stallion which provides that nominations of a mare to
be bred to the stallion by the owner of a share in the syndicate
may be sold, exchanged, or otherwise transferred or assigned,
permits the purchase of a breeding season free and clear of a
purchase money security interest of the syndicator by virtue of
U.C.C. 9-306. " 2 The Court determined that the syndicate agree-
ment did indeed authorize the sale of a breeding season free of
the security interest.3 The security agreement 4 executed by the
parties, Louis Wolfson (seller) and Anita Arbour (buyer), con-
tained no provision regarding the potential resale of breeding
seasons of Affirmed, the subject of the syndication.5 The security
agreement, however, did specifically incorporate by reference the
syndicate agreement, 6 which contained the following provision:
"Nominations may be sold, exchanged or otherwise transferred
or assigned and written notice of such transfer shall be given to
the Syndicate Manager within ten (10) days thereafter .... -7
* Associate in the firm of Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Lexington, Kentucky. B.A.
1976, Temple University; J.D. 1985, University of Kentucky.
700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985).
Id.
'Id.
Brief for Appellant at 30, Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 396
(Ky. 1985) (Appendix F).
Id. at 30-34.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 19 (Appendix E).
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The Court applied section 9-306 of the Kentucky Uniform
Commercial Code to find that the sale of the nomination was
authorized by the secured party and that Wolfson's security
interest in that nomination was, therefore, cut off upon the
sale. 8 Section 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
provides in pertinent part that "a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale ... by the debtor unless his
action was authorized by the secured party in the security agree-
ment or otherwise .... -9 The facts of Trimble indicate that
there was consent to the sale and that, under U.C.C. section 9-
306, the security interest was therefore cut off in the nomination
sold. 10 Although other important and interesting issues were
raised in the parties' briefs," the Court dealt specifically with
the application of U.C.C. section 9-306; so too does this Article.
The facts of Trimble illustrate one variation among hundreds
used in financing the thoroughbred breeding industry. This Ar-
ticle examines a few of those financing structures and the ques-
tion of a secured party's authorization of sale 2 in the context
of one of Kentucky's most famous farm products, thoroughbred
stallions held for breeding purposes. 3 There is little case law
dealing specifically with thoroughbred horses and even less also
700 S.W.2d at 398-99.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962). This Article refers to sections of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code except in those instances when a particular state's statutes are cited.
Kentucky's version of the U.C.C. can be found in Chapter 355 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. KY. REv. STAT. § 355.9-306(2) (Bobbs Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
Kentucky adopted the 1972 amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code during its
1986 legislative session. The 1972 amendments will be effective on July 1, 1987.
10 700 S.W.2d at 398-99 (consent found in the syndication agreement and incor-
porated by reference into the security agreement).
1 In particular the reader is directed to Brief for Appellee at 21-32, Trimble v.
North Ridge Farms, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985), wherein the Appellee presents an
interesting discussion of the classification of breeding seasons under the U.C.C. See also
note 13 infra.
2 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972).
11 Although in varying contexts thoroughbred horses and their breeding shares and
seasons may be properly characterized as inventory or equipment, for this discussion we
will assume that they are farm products. For an enlightening discussion on characteri-
zation of thoroughbred stallions, see Lester, Security Interest in Thoroughbred and
Standardbred Horses: A Transactional Approach, 70 Ky. L.J. 1065 (1981-82). See also
North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, No. 82-CA-1305-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); note 11
supra.
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dealing with security interests. 4 There is a significant body of
analogous law, however, dealing with livestock and farm prod-
ucts in general.
This Article reviews the varying interpretations of U.C.C.
section 9-306(2), which provides in part that a security interest
in collateral continues in the hands of a transferee if the dispo-
sition of the collateral was not authorized by the secured party,
either in the security agreement or otherwise.' 5 More specifically,
this Article examines the possibility that "course of dealing"
might create an authorization, and explores the validity and
effectiveness of conditional authorizations.
Having reviewed these issues in general, this Article examines
several possible financing options available to parties in the
syndication of a stallion and the use, sale, exchange or transfer
of breeding seasons, and suggests possible solutions to meet the
needs of parties to such transactions.
I. IMPLIED CONSENT OR WAIVER
U.C.C. section 9-306(2) provides that "a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the
secured party in the security agreement .... -,6 Secured parties
" "[North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble] appears to be the first time a Kentucky
appellate court considered a [case involving a] security interest in a thoroughbred horse."
R. Nowka, Commercial Law, 73 Ky. L.J. 315, 334 (1984-85).
" For the full text of U.C.C. § 9-306(2) in both the 1962 statute valid in Kentucky
through June of 1987, and the 1972 amended statute which will take effect on July 1,
1987, see note 16 infra.
t- See KRS § 355.9-306(2). The full text of the 1962 version of the cited section
reads: "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor
unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor."
The 1972 amended code, recently enacted but not yet effective in Kentucky, changes
this section very little:
"Except where this article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dispo-
sition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
Note that express authority to sell cuts off the security interest. See In re Special
Abrasives, Inc., 26 B.R. 399, 402 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
1985-861
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frequently require the debtor to obtain the secured party's writ-
ten consent prior to a sale of any or all of the collateral.' 7 This
requirement of prior written consent coupled with behavior by
the parties that is inconsistent with the express terms of the
security agreement creates problems.' 8 Disputes frequently arise
as to whether the secured party expressly or impliedly consented
to the sale' 9 or waived its security interest upon the sale of the
collateral. 20
Courts are split on this question. While a majority of juris-
dictions have ruled that course of dealing2' or usage of trader
will not serve to cut off a prior perfected security interest,2 a
'7 See cases cited infra notes 27-44. Many standard security agreement forms
contain such a restriction, e.g., "Debtor will not sell or offer to sell or otherwise transfer
the collateral or any interest therein without the written consent of secured party."
Security agreement used by American Bank and Trust Co. and John J. Kefalas, from
the record of Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms. Inc., U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of Kentucky, Civil Action No. 83-390.
" See text accompanying notes 27-44 infra.
'9 "The argument that the secured party's 'consent' has been given by the course
of dealing arising from previous sales and failure to rebuke seems weak because the
consent arises from the failure to object to a completed act." LEmSON & NowtcA, THE
UNIFORM COMIMERICAL CODE OF KENTUCKY § 8.4(D) at 784 (1983).
20 "Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right .... [S]ome courts have concluded that the doctrine of waiver should not operate
because the buyer has constructive notice of the security interest from the filed financing
statement and could have determined whether the sale was authorized." Id.
Pre-U.C.C. law recognized waiver of rights by course of dealing. See First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock Yards Loan Co., 65 F.2d 226, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 648 (1933).
21 "Course of dealing" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-205(l) (1972) as: "a sequence of
previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expres-
sions and other conduct."
2- "Usage of trade" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1972) as: "any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question."
2 United States v. E.W. Savage & Son, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123, 126 (D.S.D. 1972),
aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope
Investments, Inc., 539 P.2d 501, 503-04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Vermilion County Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 249 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); North Cent. Kan.
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 577 P.2d 35, 39-40 (Kan. 1978); Farmer's
State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 212 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Neb. 1973);
Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 N.W.2d 99, 103-04 (Neb. 1971); Baker
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 513 P.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Or. 1973); Fisher
v. First Nat'l Bank, 584 S.W.2d 515, 518-20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also notes 37-
44 infra and accompanying text.
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sizeable minority have found either consent or waiver based upon
the parties' course of dealing.24 The difference lies in each court's
determination of the proper party to bear the risk of loss. Should
the buyer, charged with constructive knowledge, bear the risk
of not checking the records to determine if a valid security
interest exists in the goods he is purchasing,25 or is the secured
party in the best position to prevent the loss by enforcing the
provisions of its contract with the debtor?26
A. Minority Rule
The leading case asserting the minority position is Clovis
National Bank v. Thomas.27 Clovis National Bank was a con-
version action by the secured party against a market agency for
the wrongful sale of cattle covered by a security agreement. 28
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that where the secured
party had previously and repeatedly permitted the debtor to sell
the collateral without the prior written permission required by
the security agreement, merely relying upon the debtor to apply
the proceeds to the indebtedness, the bank had consented to the
sale of the cattle. 29 The court based its decision upon both the
course of performance of a prior security agreement with the
particular debtor and upon the secured party's course of dealing
with all of its debtors. 0 Finding that the U.C.C. did not exclude
24 United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F.Supp. 1033, 1034 (D.N.D.
1972); Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 511 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Ark. 1974); Hedrick
Say. Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1975); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas,
425 P.2d 726, 730-31 (N.M. 1967); Central Wash. Prod. Cred. Ass'n v. Baker, 521 P.2d
226, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See also notes 27-36 infra and accompanying text.
' See In re Ellsworth, 722 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984) (buyer could have
checked with secured party before buying and therefore took a chance); 577 P.2d at 41
(equitable doctrine of waiver would not be applied in favor of buyer who had constructive
notice of security interest but did not check the public records).
"- See Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 67a P.2d 52,
56 (Idaho 1984) (risk of loss falls on secured party permitting the goods to be placed
on the market). See also Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa
1973) and 425 P.2d 726 in which the secured party was held to be in a better position
to protect itself than the buyer.
21 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
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the application of waiver, the court concluded that, through
U.C.C. section 1-103, ' the law of waiver by implied acquies-
cence or consent cut off the security interest.12
A vigorous dissent argued the merits of the majority rule
which would not find a waiver by course of dealing. 3 The dissent
also pointed out the strong language of U.C.C. section 1-205(4),
which requires that the terms of an express agreement control
over any inconsistent course of dealing or usage of trade.3 4
Clovis National Bank is cited repeatedly by courts as a
leading case for the minority position. a5 The New Mexico legis-
lature, however, subsequently responded to Clovis National Bank
by adding the following sentence to section 9-306(2) of the New
Mexico commercial code: "A security interest in farm products
and the proceeds thereof shall not be considered waived by the
secured party by any course of dealing between the parties or
by any trade usage.' '36
B. Majority Rule
Garden City Production Credit Ass'n v. Lannan37 is fairly
representative of the majority position. In Lannan, on several
occasions, the debtor sold collateral without the requisite prior
consent and endorsed the proceeds check to the secured party.
The secured party never rebuked the debtor for these actions.
" U.C.C § 1-103 (1972) provides, "Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions."
Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. Section 1-103 states, "The listing given in this
section is merely illustrative."
12 425 P.2d at 732.
" Id. at 734 (Carmody, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 736. For text of U.C.C. Section 1-205(4), see note 41 infra.
" See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626
F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1980) (Under Oklahoma law, consent to sell can be both express
and implied.); Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 577 P.2d
589, 593 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("course of performance, or other conduct subsequent
to the agreement can amount to a waiver.") (emphasis in original). See also In re Frank
Meador Leasing, Inc., 6 B.R. 910, 914 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (implied, if not express,
consent found in automobile floor plan financing).
36 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-306(2) (1978).
17 186 N.W.2d 99 (Neb. 1971).
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The transaction giving rise to the controversy began as usual.
The debtor, through a livestock broker, sold collateral (cattle)
to Augustine and endorsed the resulting sight draft to the secured
party. The draft was not honored. By this time, Augustine had
resold the cattle to Lannan. Subsequently, the secured party
filed an action to recover the cattle from Lannan.3 8 The court
found that the secured party's failure to rebuke the debtor for
the prior sale of collateral without consent did not by itself
waive the security interest. 39 The court noted that, while course
of dealing might be relevant to a dispute between a debtor and
a secured party as parties to the agreement, it was not dispositive
of Lannan's rights?4 The court also relied upon U.C.C. section
1-205(4) which provides that express terms of an agreement will
control in the face of an inconsistent course of dealing.4'
Many courts have found that course of dealing or usage of
trade is not enough to imply consent or to find a waiver of a
security interest. 42 The reasoning of these decisions has been
fairly uniform. Courts have placed emphasis on the impact of
U.C.C. section 1-205(4), 43 and have found a lack of sufficient
intent to create a waiver. 44
' Id. at 101.
" Id. at 103.
I' Id.
Id. at 103-04. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1972) provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or
usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing
controls usage of trade.
1 Security Nat'l Bank v. Belleville Livestock Comm'n Co., 619 F.2d 840, 845-46
(10th Cir. 1979) (under Kansas law, course of conduct not sufficient to waive a security
interest); North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 577 P.2d 35,
41 (course of conduct not sufficient for waiver although creditor was found to have
expressly consented to sale by the debtor). Cf. In re Ellsworth, 722 F.2d 1448, 1450-51
(under Arizona law, when course of dealing was that the debtor sold cattle, obtained
cash, paid the secured party and secured party then released the security interest, security
interest in collateral was not cut off when proceeds were not used to pay secured party).
4 619 F.2d at 845 (Tenth Circuit affirmed trial court's reliance on U.C.C. Section
1-205(4)). See note 41 supra for text of U.C.C. § 1-205 (4)).
577 P.2d at 41 ("waiver" implies voluntary and intentional renunciation of a
known right).
1985-86]
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C. Policy Arguments
Both the minority and majority positions are supportable.
The minority, or Clovis National Bank position, places the risk
of loss on the secured party as the party best able to avoid the
loss by placing conditions on the sale of collateral or by strictly
enforcing the terms of the security agreement. 45 To hold other-
wise effectively validates a conditional consent, 46 the condition
being that the security interest will be released when and if the
debtor pays the proceeds of the sale to the secured party. This
is a condition the performance of which the buyer cannot con-
trol. 47
The majority, or Lannan, rule places the risk of loss on the
buyer. 48 Under article nine of the U.C.C., a buyer ordinarily49
has the burden of checking the records to determine whether
there is a pre-existing security interest on the goods he wishes to
buy.5 0 The buyer is charged with constructive knowledge of any
financing statement properly recorded."' The farm products
1' "As between a third party purchaser who agreed to no condition and the security
holder which permitted the goods to be placed on the market, clearly the third party
has superior right to the goods." Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed
Lots, 678 P.2d at 56.
1 For a discussion of conditional consent, see notes 85-130 infra and accompanying
text.
4' Conditions may be valid and effective to control the release of the secured
party's interest if the buyer can control the performance of the condition. See notes 85-
130 infra and accompanying text.
48 "[Tihe equitable doctrine of waiver should not be utilized in favor of one who
has constructive notice of a lien, and admittedly has been remiss in checking the public
records maintained, at least in part, for his protection." North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 577 P.2d at 41.
19 Some buyers qualify for special treatment. U.C.C. Section 9-307(1), entitled
"Protection of Buyers of Goods," provides: "A buyer in [the] ordinary course of
business ... other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." (emphasis
added) (U.C.C. § 1-201(9) defines "buyer in the ordinary course of business"). Because
we are assuming for the purpose of this discussion that thoroughbred horses, breeding
shares and seasons would be characterized as farm products, a security interest would
not be cut off by sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
Note that U.C.C. §§ 9-308 and 9-309 (1972) determine when purchasers of chattel
paper, instruments, negotiable instruments, negotiable documents and securities may
take free of a security interest, even if perfected and even if the sale is not authorized.
See 577 P.2d at 41.
I d.
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exception52 notifies the buyer that his responsibility is greater
when buying "farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations."53 The buyer is put on notice that he takes the farm
products subject to a prior security interest unless the transaction
was authorized.5 4 It is therefore reasonable to place the risk of
loss on a buyer who does not check the records or requests a
consent to sale from the secured party.55
Some courts, as discussed previously, have allowed buyers
to rely on the course of dealing between the debtor and the
secured party, even though the buyer usually has no reason to
know of that conduct. 6 The Ninth Circuit, in In re Ellsworth,5 7
reversed this concept and found that the relevant course of
dealing was "when [the debtor] sold cattle, it obtained cash and
paid [the secured party], at which point [the secured party]
released its interest in the sold cattle." s The court determined
that the course of dealing reinforced, rather than cut off, the
secured party's interest when the proceeds were not received.
D. The Kentucky Position
Kentucky's position on this issue is unclear. In Universal
C.L T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc., 9 the
" The exception to U.C.C. § 9-307(1) buyer in the ordinary course of business
rule is one who buys "farm products from a person engaged in farming operations."
In U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1972) the Uniform Commercial Code classifies goods as "farm
products if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations
or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states. . ., and if
they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other
farming operations."
Two frequently cited policies underlying the farm products exception include (I)
providing extra security for farm products lenders results in more money available to
farmers, and (2) the traditional concept of the yeoman farmer (i.e., strong buyers and
weak sellers). The farm products exception has been frequently criticized. See Dolan,
Section 9-307(1): The U.C.C. "s Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market,
72 NW. U.L. REV. 706, 716-19, 736 (1977-78) (Dolan believes courts have construed
"otherwise" language too strictly.).
U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See note 49 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
Problems may, of course, arise with characterization of the collateral. See note
13 supra.
" See cases cited supra note 25.
" But see Anon, Inc. v. Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n, 446 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (although actual authority was found, buyer lacked any knowledge of secured
creditor's conduct and thus, there could be no detrimental reliance).
" 722 F.2d 1448.
" Id. at 1450.
- 424 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1968).
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debtors (some of whom were also buyers) alleged a waiver by
the secured party's prior conduct. 60 In support of their conten-
tion, the debtors cited U.C.C. section 2-20861 covering the effect
of course of performance on the conduct of a contract for sale.
62
The court noted that the cited provision applies only to contracts
for the sale of goods under article two of the U.C.C. and was
thus irrelevant. 63 The court ultimately found that the condition
to consent 64 in the security agreement was met and that the
security interest was released upon sale. 65 In dicta, the court
mused, "it could be that [KRS Section 355.9-306(2)] is broad
enough to protect a bank, which with no knowledge of violation
of the agreement, loans money [to a buyer] in reliance on the
apparent authority of the retailer to make the sales. ' 66 The court
then stated that Clovis National Bank67 and the official anno-
tation to the U.C.C.68 lend credence to this possibility.
69
In 1979, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Cessna Fi-
nance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc. 70 The Court's holding
was based on U.C.C. section 9-307(1), 71 providing that a sale to
' Id. at 410.
61 Id. at 411.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement.
(3) Subject to the provisions of [U.C.C. § 2-209] on modification and
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
KRS § 355.2-208(1) and (3)(1972).
" 424 S.W.2d at 411. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1972) states, "Unless the context otherwise
requires, this Articles applies to transactions in goods ......
- See text accompanying notes 120-23 infra.
15 424 S.W.2d at 412-13. (To sell in the "ordinary course of trade" as authorized
in the security agreement would release the lien under KRS § 355.9-306(2)).
Id. at 413.
' Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967). For a discussion of
Clovis Nat'l Bank, see notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
- There is nothing in the Official Comments to U.C.C. § 306(2) to support this
conclusion.
424 S.W.2d at 413.
580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979).
Id. at 494.
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a buyer in the ordinary course of business cuts off a prior
security interest. The Court stated that section 9-306(1) is an
exception to the general rule of the section 9-306(2) consent
requirement. 72 In dicta, the Court opined that the buyer would
take free of the security interest even if it had known of the
violation of the security agreement. 73 "The trial court found that
Cessna Finance had countenanced the sale of aircraft by Du-
Page, even though its consent had not been given. Such acqui-
escence by Cessna Finance was sufficient to waive the restriction
in the mortgage. ' 74
Commentary on this question is also sparse. Leibson and
Nowka in The Uniform Commerical Code of Kentucky75 ana-
lyzed the split in authority discussed above. Their conclusion is
fairly summarized: "[I]t is possible to find an 'or otherwise'
authorization even when the security agreement requires the
secured party's consent, ... such a conclusion should be based
on more evidence than just the secured party's failure to object
to previous sales."176 Nowka, in a later article commented, "This
otherwise authorization includes authorizations which are im-
plied from a secured party's conduct. '77
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has decided an issue that
may be critical to Kentucky's eventual position on U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-306(2). In Savannah Sugar Refinery v. R.C. Canada Dry
Bottling Co. ,78 the court relied on KRS section 355.1-205(4)79
and refused to modify or construe a contract based upon a
course of dealing inconsistent with the express terms of the
agreement.so This section is applicable to article nine issues as
well as article two issues.8
" Id. But see LEIBSON & NOWKA, supra note 19 § 8.4(D) at 886 n.616 (U.C.C. §
9-306(1) is not an exception to U.C.C. § 9-306(2)).
11 580 S.W.2d at 494 n.8.
"4 Id. Note that the collateral in Cessna Finance Corp. was inventory, not farm
products.
" LEISON & NOWKA, supra note 19.
76 Id. § 8.4(D) at 784-85.
" Nowka, supra note 14 at 337.
593 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1962). See note 41 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 1-205(4).
593 S.W.2d at 884.
" Article one of the U.C.C., as indicated by its title (Short Title, Construction,
Application and Subject Matter of the Act), modifies the entire U.C.C.
1985-86]
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Southwest Washington Production Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-
First National Bank12 presents an interesting analysis of U.C.C.
section 1-205(4) as applied to this problem. "[U.C.C. section 1-
205(4)] has two purposes: first, it compliments the parol evidence
rule regarding the interpretation of written agreements... ; sec-
ond, it gives parties to a series of contracts the freedom to
change their relationship by agreement .... It is apparent that
neither of these purposes is frustrated by permitting waiver to
be imposed from conduct subsequent to the written agree-
ment. "83
As it stands now in Kentucky, although there is dicta favor-
ing the minority position,8 there is no clear holding that a
security interest can be waived or that consent can be implied
by course of dealing.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT
"There is nothing in the [Uniform Commercial] Code ...
to prevent a secured party from attaching conditions or limita-
tions to its consent to sales of collateral by a debtor. If such
conditions are imposed, then a sale by the debtor in violation
of those conditions is an unauthorized sale and the security
interest, under [U.C.C. section 9-306(2)] continues in the collat-
eral." 85
A review of cases involving conditional consent results in a
clear pattern with few aberrations. 86 Conditions that must be
satisfied prior to the transaction are valid, and should the trans-
action occur without satisfaction of the conditions, the security
interest will continue in the collateral.87 Conditions that must be
12 577 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd, 593 P.2d 167 (Wash. 1979) (consent
to sale was conditioned upon prior written authorization and was not waived).
' 577 P.2d at 593.
See 580 S.W.2d at 494 n.8.
' Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 513 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Or.
1973).
. The condition of "sales in the ordinary course of business" does not immediately
fit into the formula described herein, but satisfies the policy considerations. Although
the buyer cannot control what is in the ordinary course of business, he or she can
ascertain whether the transaction will comply with the condition. See text accompanying
notes 105-12 infra.
" See Anon, Inc. v. Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n, 446 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983).
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met after, or even at the time of, the transaction will be enforced
only if the means to meet the condition are in the hands of the
transferee.88
Under this analysis, requiring prior written authorization is
a form of conditional consent. The condition, prior written
authorization, must be satisfied prior to the sale. Therefore,
prior consent is a condition precedent to the transaction and, if
enforced, is effective in controlling the release of the secured
party's security interest. 9
A few jurisdictions have flatly stated that conditional au-
thorizations will not preserve a security interest. In Western
Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc.,90
alleging the conversion of grain, the secured party argued that
it had authorized the sale of barley (collateral) on the condition
of payment. 9' The secured party did not receive payment and
wanted to enforce its security agreement against the purchaser. 92
The court found this position "clearly inconsistent with [U.C.C.
section 9-306], comment 3, which states: '[T]he transferee will
take free whenever the disposition is authorized. . . ."93 The
court pointed out that neither the U.C.C. nor the comments to
the U.C.C. make a distinction between conditional and uncon-
ditional consent to sale.94 Simplot Feed Lots places the risk of
loss on the secured party who "permitted the goods to be placed
on the market ' 95 rather than the buyer who was not a party to
the agreement.
The condition in Simplot Feed Lot was to be satisfied con-
current with or after the transfer of the collateral and was not
within the buyer's control. Anon, Inc. v. Farmers Production
Credit Ass'n 96 addressed this distinction directly. Anon held
that a consent on the condition thdt the debtor remit the pro-
SId.
Although this condition may be valid, it is of limited effect insuring that the
secured party will receive the proceeds of the sale.
678 P.2d 52 (Idaho 1984).
I' d. at 55.
,Id.
Id. at 55-56.
" Id. at 56.
' Id.
'4 446 N.E.2d at 661-62.
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ceeds is equivalent to a waiver of the security interest. 97 In dicta,
the court listed types of conditions that would protect the secured
party, 98 noting that these conditions were "ascertainable by the
purchaser prior to the consummation of the sale; ... matters
that the buyer, by checking the record and calling the secured
party, could control."' 9
In re Sunriver Farms, Inc.00 provides an example of an
effective condition. In Sunriver Farms, the court held that a
secured party's interest should be enforced if (1) consent to the
sale is conditioned on the issuance of the proceeds check to both
the secured party and the debtor as joint payees, and if (2) the
secured party has notified the buyer of the condition prior to
delivery of the goods.'°'
In Baker Production Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co.,
Inc.,102 the trial court found consent by the secured party on the
condition that the buyer's drafts were honored and paid. 0 3 When
the condition was not met, the security interest remained in
force.' °4 Although the condition could be met concurrent with
or after the transaction, it was within the buyer's control.
A fairly common provision found in security agreements
covering inventory collateral'05 allows sales "in the ordinary
course of trade."6 This provision increases the secured party's
Id. at 662.
Id. at 661.
'Id.
100 27 B.R. 655 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982).
303 Id. at 665. See also North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Boese, 577 P.2d
824 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (secured party did not lose security interest in collateral where
secured party expressly demanded that all future checks for proceeds of sale be jointly
payable to secured party and debtor).
""2 513 P.2d 1129 (Or. 1973).
101 Id. at 1133.
,o Id. at 1134.
'9' The secured party has an interest in facilitating the sale of inventory collateral
to provide an ongoing source of income with which the debtor can retire the debt.
-9' What constitutes "in the ordinary course of trade" is a question of fact, usually
determined by evidence that the "acts were common and ordinary practice among local
businesses of the same type." Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor
Sales, 424 S.W.2d 409, 413 n.1 (Ky. 1968). See also Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 301 P.2d 212, 217 (Okla. 1956) ("ordinary course of trade" includes all
transactions between parties who, "in their ordinary business dealings, effected a sale
and purchase for a consideration sufficient to support a simple contract").
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risk that his security interest will be cut off by the sale of the
security because "ordinary course of trade" is a lower standard
than "ordinary course of business."'' 0 7 In First Security Bank v.
Absco Warehouse, Inc.,08 a conflict arose between a bank with
a security interest in inventory and a supplier who had sold the
inventory to the debtor on open account.' °9 The security agree-
ment contained a consent to sale of the inventory "in the ordi-
nary course of business" and required that all sales be for cash
or credit of not more than thirty days."10 When the debtor
returned some of the inventory to the supplier for credit, was
the bank's security interest cut off?"' The court held that a
return of goods to a supplier to cancel a pre-existing debt did
not fall within the class of authorized sales." 2
In North Central Kansas Production Credit Ass'n v. Wash-
ington Sales Co.," 3 the court confronted alternative conditions
in the security agreement. The debtor was authorized to sell
collateral (1) with the secured party's prior written permission,
or (2) with payment by the buyer made jointly to the debtor
and secured party." 4 These conditions were held valid." 5 The
-o' "Buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(9) as:
A person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party
in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) also defines "buying." See note 112 infra for the text of U.C.C. §
1-201(9).
- 664 P.2d 281 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
- Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283.
,n Id. at 284. The court relied upon U.C.C. § 1-201(9) to determine that the
transfer of merchandise was in satisfaction of a money debt and therefore not "buying."
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) states:
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured
or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title
under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in
bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
577 P.2d 35.
Id. at 38.
Nevertheless, the conditions were not dispositive of the issue because the court
found that the secured party had orally given express consent to the sale, thus cutting
off the security interest in the collateral.
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first condition was to be met prior to the transaction and the
second was within the buyer's control.
One of the most frequently cited decisions on conditional
consent is First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Pro-
cessors, Inc.," 6 wherein a secured party conditioned its consent
on receipt of the proceeds. In this case the security agreement
made no reference to sales, neither restricting them nor con-
senting to them." 7 The court, therefore, looked to a related
credit agreement between the parties and the secured party's
testimony to find the terms of the conditional consent."8 The
condition was held ineffective to preserve the security interest
because it made the buyer "an insurer of acts beyond its con-
trol."" 9 Again, we see the failure of a condition that must be
met concurrent with or after the transaction (condition subse-
quent) and is not in the buyer's control.
In Universal C.LT. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor
Sales, 20 Kentucky's highest Court found a consent conditioned
on sales "in the ordinary course of trade."' 2' The case involved
inventory financing of an automobile dealership. The sale in
question would not fall under U.C.C. section 9-307(1) because
the buyers could not qualify as buyers in the ordinary course of
business.'2 Nevertheless, the transaction itself qualified as "in
the ordinary course of trade" as the evidence showed that sales
of this type were "common and usual among car dealers in the
area." 2
Clearly, it is possible to create a condition to consent that
will be effective in controlling the release of the secured party's
interest in the collateral. The condition must be either one that
is ascertainable by the buyer prior to the transaction and is
within the buyer's control' 24 or one that must be met prior to
336 626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980).
'' Id. at 766.
"8 Id. at 766-67.
"9 Id. at 769.
0 424 S.W.2d 409.
2 Id. at 413.
m Id. at 412. The buyers, in this case, were the owners of the debtor automobile
dealership and therefore, could not qualify as buyers in the ordinary course of business.
2 Id. at 413.
324 For example, a requirement that the proceeds of the sale be paid jointly to both
the debtor and the secured party is such a condition.
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the transaction.'2 Prior written consent falls into the latter cat-
egory.' 26 The cases discussed above indicate that enforcement of
the condition may be essential.' 27 Although the majority of ju-
risdictions do not find implied consent or waiver in a course of
dealing inconsistent with such an express condition,' 28 the mi-
nority of jurisdictions do so find.'2 9 Kentucky's position is un-
clear and therefore requires caution.'30 It might be advisable in
Kentucky to operate under the assumption that a course of
conduct will imply consent or waive a security interest.
APPLICATION TO THE THOROUGHBRED BREEDING INDUSTRY
The principles discussed herein are particularly applicable to
the thoroughbred breeding industry. Financing is an absolute
necessity for much of the industry. For example, the stallion
that was the subject of the syndication agreement in Trimble
was Affirmed, a triple crown winner retired to stud. 13 1 Thirty-
six breeding shares were sold. 132 The particular breeding share
litigated in Trimble was originally sold to Anita Arbour for
$400,000.00.1"1 During the course of the litigation, the breeding
share was resold for almost $600,000.00.134 The arrangement
existing between Louis Wolfson, the secured party, and Anita
Arbour, the purchaser of the breeding share, is quite common
in the breeding industry.
The owner of a breeding share, while having other less
important rights, has the right to breed one mare to the stallion
each year. It is generally understood, and frequently expressly
provided, that the owner of the breeding share may sell, ex-
change, or otherwise transfer breeding seasons to another party.
'-" The secured party may condition consent to sale upon its receipt of proceeds
prior to the consummation of the transaction.
'2 Prior written consent is a classic example. The secured party must police its
agreement to insure the continuing effectiveness of this condition.
1, See cases cited supra notes 23-84.
':' See cases cited supra note 23; text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
I2, See cases cited supra note 24; text accompanying notes 27-36 supra.
"r See notes 59-84 supra and accompanying text.
'" Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
"' Id.
Id. at 5.
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Frequently such sales of breeding seasons provide the only in-
come from which the secured debt can be paid. Naturally the
secured party wishes to insure that he or she will receive the
proceeds from any such sale, and wants to remain secured in
the collateral if the proceeds are not applied to the debt. Thus
the secured party will wish to structure the security agreement
to insure that the security interest is not automatically cut off
on the sale, but rather continues in the collateral until the secured
party receives the proceeds.
The buyer is assumed to have knowledge of any properly
filed financing statement.'3 The filing system is, at least in part,
for the buyer's protection. The buyer should use this protection
by attempting to ascertain whether there is a prior security
interest.'3 6 In this way, the buyer can determine the conditions
placed on the sale and, to the extent he is able, comply with
them to eliminate any security interest.
The parties' first option is to exclude language about the
sale of some or all of the collateral. 37 In the absence of a
prohibition on sale or express consent to sale, course of dealing
and usage of trade may be used to interpret, explain or supple-
ment the agreement. 3 Therefore, if the secured party wishes the
security interest to continue in collateral after the sale, he must
insure that his actions toward the debtor or any similar debtor
will not lead a buyer or a court to believe that he has consented
to a sale. The secured party should instead establish a course of
dealing with the debtor that indicates no consent to sale prior
to the receipt of proceeds. This is certainly not the best approach
"I See note 48 supra.
I3m
The purchaser, of course, can protect himself by ascertaining whether a
security interest exists and by requiring that he be furnished with proof of
the secured party's consent. In this way, he can learn whether there are
any conditions attached to the consent which could prevent him from
taking free of the security interest.
Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 513 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Or. 1973).
,'7 In Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, the court
of appeals stated in a related matter, "Obviously, in the absence of any provision in
the security agreement requiring written authorization to sell, a course of dealing between
the parties indicating consent to sale of the collateral, is conduct which establishes
waiver." 577 P.2d 589, 592 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
"' U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1972).
[Vol. 74
IMPLIED AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT
because it leaves much to the chance that a court will interpret
the parties' actions as they intended. On the contrary, the court
may hold that had the secured party not acquiesced in the sales,
he would have provided for restrictions in the security agree-
ment.
The second possibility is to expressly require the debtor to
pay cash representing a proportionate amount of the balance
due prior to the transfer of the season or share. The secured
party would release the security interest on each individual sea-
son or share after receiving payment. This condition must be
met prior to the transaction and, therefore, will be effective in
controlling the release of the security interest. 13 9 This alternative,
however, places a hardship on the debtor who must raise a large
sum of cash prior to receiving the proceeds of the sale. Rarely
will a prospective buyer hand over cash before the transaction
is consummated. The practicalities of this alternative are, there-
fore, prohibitive. While this method is clear in its terms and
intent, it greatly hinders the debtor's attempts to sell breeding
seasons.
The third, and perhaps most common approach, is for the
secured party to require the debtor to obtain prior written con-
sent to the sale. This method will preserve the security interest
if consent is not obtained. 14 Yet the secured party must carefully
avoid establishing a course of dealing that could lead to finding
implied consent or waiver.' 4' Although Kentucky has not taken
a firm position on this issue, there are indications that Kentucky
might follow the minority rule and find implied consent to sale
or waiver of the security interest by an inconsistent course of
dealing. 42
If the debtor sells without the prior written consent of the
secured party, the court will either (1) find that the security
interest continues in the collateral in the hands of the buyer, (2)
find that course of dealing has cut off the security interest in
the collateral, or (3) find that the secured party has somehow
"I See notes 85-130 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of conditional
consent.
1, See text accompanying notes 16-84 supra.
141 See text accompanying notes 27-36 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 59-84 supra.
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expressly consented to the sale. Should the security interest con-
tinue in the collateral, Kentucky law requires the secured party
to pursue his remedies against the debtor to the fullest extent
before pursuing the collateral in the buyer's hands. 143
Should the debtor follow the authorized procedure and ob-
tain prior written consent, the security interest will be cut off,
yet there is no guarantee that the secured party will then receive
the proceeds of the sales. By clearly eliminating the security
interest, this route would forestall any attempt by the buyer to
subsequently rescind the transaction for breach of the warranty
of title. 144
The fourth option, granting authorization to sell in the or-
dinary course of business, is not as appropriate to a transaction
in the thoroughbred breeding industry as it is to a security
interest in more conventional inventory. 145 Defining an "ordinary
course of business" in the context of thoroughbred syndications
might be more difficult. It calls upon a somewhat smaller group
of parties and transactions to set the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" than does, for example, the auto industry.
This option will provide much protection to the secured
.party, although it will facilitate the debtor's ability to sell. It is
a condition that the Kentucky courts have expressly approved. 1
It is analogous, although not identical and less stringent, to the
concept of buyer in the ordinary course of business found in
U.C.C. section 9-307(1)147 and reflects similar policy considera-
tions. 148
As a fifth option, the secured party may expressly require
that the proceeds from each season or share sold be paid jointly
,,3 Kentucky has added a unique section to article nine. KRS § 355.9-319 (1984)
requires that when the collateral is livestock or grain, a secured party must fully pursue
its remedy against the debtor before it can move against the buyer. This provision clearly
"contemplates a situation where the secured party did not consent to the sale." LIEBSoN
& NowKA, supra note 19, § 8.4(C) at 757. This provision does not cut off the security
interest in the collateral, rather it creates a buyer's defense should the secured party
move against the buyer before exhausting its remedies against the debtor.
- See Sandige v. Stephens, 67 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1934).
"41 See notes 105-12 supra and accompanying text.
"16 See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc., 424 S.W.2d
409, 412-13 (Ky. 1968).
'14 See note 106 supra for a definition of ordinary course of business.
" Both provisions are better suited to general inventory financing situations.
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to the secured party and the debtor.'49 This option is similar to
consent conditional upon the secured party's receipt of the pro-
ceeds. Yet the first is enforceable while the latter is not. Once
the buyer supplies the consideration for the transaction, the
debtor is the only party who can insure that the proceeds are
applied to the debt. The transfer of proceeds from the debtor
to the secured party will most often occur after the sale and is
not under the buyer's control. 50
On the other hand, a requirement that the proceeds be paid
jointly to the debtor and the secured party accomplishes the aim
of the secured party's receipt of the proceeds. This condition is
effective because the buyer can ascertain it before the transaction
and it is under the buyer's control.
Finally, the secured party can permit the debtor to finance
the sale of shares to a buyer. For his or her own protection, the
secured party will want to outline the parameters of the financing
transaction, if not require a detailed plan. The secured party
should consider requiring inclusion of his or her name as one
of the secured parties. This inclusion is the equivalent of being
a joint payee on a check: the buyer is notified of the secured
party's interest, and compliance with the condition is within the
buyer's control. This option provides the secured party with
additional protection. Although the original security interest in
the collateral given by the debtor is cut off, the secured party
now has a new security interest given by the buyer and is
protected either way. If the conditions to consent are not met,
the buyer takes subject to the original security interest; if the
conditions are met, the old security interest dies and a new one
arises.
The security agreement in Trimble v. North Ridge Farms,
Inc.' incorporated by reference the secured party's consent to
sale in the syndication agreement. 5 2 Even if the consent had not
been included in the security agreement, the court may have
",9 This has been held effective by several courts. See, e.g. North Cent. Kan. Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Boise, 577 P.2d 824 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
' See notes 85-130 supra and accompanying text.
"' 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985). For a discussion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals'
decision in this case, see Nowka, supra note 14 at 334-36.
"2 Brief for Appellant, supra note 4.
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applied the consent to sale of the syndication agreement. As
previously noted, 5 3 the Tenth Circuit in First National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 54 found the terms of a
conditional consent not in the security agreement that made no
reference to sales, but in a related credit agreement between the
parties and in the secured party's testimony. 55 It can be assumed
that when consent is found "otherwise ' "56 than in the security
agreement, both the debtor and the secured party must be parties
to, or be bound by, the document or agreement containing such
consent. Thus, if a security agreement is silent on the question
of sales, and an unincorporated syndication agreement by which
both the debtor and the secured party are bound authorizes
sales, then the court may find consent has been given.
CONCLUSION
The Trimble lower court opinions, facts and appellate briefs
raised many questions pertaining to the application of certain
provisions of the U.C.C. to the thoroughbred breeding industry.
Unfortunately few of those questions were answered. It is un-
clear whether Kentucky will follow the minority rule and find
that course of dealing can imply consent to sale under KRS
355.9-306(2), or the majority rule, requiring actual consent. In-
dications in dicta found in the various Kentucky cases suggest
that the lower courts lean toward the minority or Clovis rule.
The Kentucky Court of Appeal's interpretation of KRS 355.1-
205(4) in Savannah Sugar, however, shows that the court is
reluctant to modify an express written agreement by course of
dealing.
The related issue of conditional consent can be the answer
to avoiding any problem created by course of dealing. The test
seems to be that a conditional consent is effective in preserving
the security interest of the secured party if the condition must
be satisfied before the transaction. If the condition is satisfied
at or after the transaction, the buyer must have the means to
meet the condition.
" See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 766-67.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972).
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Many of the problems encountered in this area can be avoided
by careful drafting of the security agreement and the syndication
agreement. If a secured party wishes to enable the debtor to sell
seasons or shares of a thoroughbred horse, the drafter must
think about the varying interpretations of UCC 9-306(2). Per-
haps the best alternative is to draft an effective conditional
consent. Regardless of the condition chosen, the secured party
must be careful to enforce the terms of the agreement. If the
party's course of dealing becomes an issue the secured party
may find his or her security interest cut off prior to satisfaction
of the debt.

